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UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Robert Post*
It is a rare privilege to be read and engaged by such thoughtful and
insightful commentators as the Washington Law Review has assembled.
It is exhilarating to participate in a conversation of this range and
intensity. I am very grateful to the Washington Law Review, Ronald K.L.
Collins and David Skover, and the University of Washington School of
Law, for making this symposium possible.
As I read the contributions to this symposium, I am put in mind of
Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous injunction that “[w]e must think things
not words, or at least we must constantly translate our words into the
facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and the true.”1
Although lawyers love words and language, “the real justification of a
rule of law,” Holmes argued, “is that it helps to bring about a social end
which we desire.”2 Holmes’ advice was to pay close attention to whether
our legal words in fact function to serve our social ends.
Nowhere is the disjunction between words and ends more apparent
than in First Amendment jurisprudence. We suffer from First
Amendment hypertrophy. Doctrine proliferates endlessly and
meaninglessly. Around every corner is yet another confusing First
Amendment “test.” We barely ever stop to ask what social ends are
actually served by this barrage of inconsistent and abstract doctrine. We
rarely take time to “translate our [First Amendment] words into the facts
for which they stand.”
The illuminating contribution of Bruce E.H. Johnson and Sarah K.
Duran3 seems fortunately almost immune from this affliction. Strategic
* Dean and Sol & Lillian Goldman Professor of Law, Yale Law School. The author retains the
copyright in this article and authorizes royalty-free reproduction for non-profit purposes, provided
any such reproduction contains a customary legal citation to the Washington Law Review.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460
(1899). Holmes’ words came in an address delivered before the New York State Bar Association on
January 17, 1899.
2. Id.
3. Bruce E.H. Johnson & Sarah K. Duran, A View from the First Amendment Trenches:

549
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Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) are theoretically
interesting precisely because they illustrate the disjunction between legal
words and social ends. Plaintiffs bring SLAPP suits to enforce rights
created by substantive legal doctrine. Substantive legal doctrine,
especially when subject to constitutional standards that determine
whether particular speech acts should receive First Amendment
immunity, ought accurately to reflect our values. At first blush,
therefore, SLAPP suits ought not to be problematic; defendants should
prevail whenever constitutional standards provide that their speech
deserves constitutional protection.
This way of thinking, however, does not pay sufficient attention to
how legal standards actually function. It fails to appreciate the
transaction costs associated with litigation enforcing substantive
doctrine. Defending even an unmeritorious suit can be costly and timeconsuming, and this expense will likely discourage otherwise protected
participation in public discussion. The anti-SLAPP statutes Johnson and
Duran discuss are designed to address and nullify such transaction costs.
They not only shift attorneys’ fees, but they also create pathways for the
“prompt and inexpensive” resolution of SLAPP suits.4 Johnson and
Duran invite us to theorize the actual behavioral effects of enforcing
substantive First Amendment standards; they direct our attention to the
reality that underlies doctrine.
The idea that substantive First Amendment rules should take account
of the transaction costs of litigating First Amendment rights is a deep
insight. It ultimately derives from the legal realism inspired by Holmes.
Johnson and Duran are concerned with how the costs of enforcing First
Amendment doctrine affect actual participation in public discourse. The
first decision of the U.S. Supreme Court systematically to reason in this
way was New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 which fashioned the “actual
malice” rule precisely to nullify the transaction costs of libel litigation.6
It designed the actual malice rule to anticipate and nullify the “chilling
Washington State’s New Protections for Public Discourse and Democracy, 87 WASH. L. REV. 495
(2012).
4. Id. at 497.
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. Id. at 279. Under the “actual malice” standard, a public official must prove with “convincing
clarity” that a statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not” before recovering for defamation. Id. at 279–80, 285–86. The case
represented a revolution in legal thinking. Robert C. Post, Justice William J. Brennan and the
Warren Court, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 11, 22–23 (1991). Whether the actual malice rule was
ultimately successful is a debatable question. See RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND
THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 200–04 (1987).
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effect” of ordinary and otherwise constitutionally defensible substantive
rules of defamation liability. The anti-SLAPP statutes so helpfully
analyzed by Johnson and Duran are legislative interventions created to
accomplish precisely the same result.7
Anti-SLAPP statutes anticipate and nullify the chilling effects
produced by First Amendment litigation. Johnson and Duran discuss
various forms of anti-SLAPP statutes that differently specify the precise
scope of public participation that ought to be protected from the
transaction costs of First Amendment litigation.8 It is clear that we can
intelligibly evaluate the differences among these anti-SLAPP statutes
only if we first specify the precise “social ends” that we wish to use First
Amendment doctrine to attain.
This may sound like an obvious framework for analysis, but it is all
too frequently ignored in First Amendment scholarship. The social ends
that underlie First Amendment doctrine are deeply obscure. Misled by
the seeming simplicity and generality of First Amendment doctrine, we
imagine that the goal of First Amendment doctrine is to protect speech
itself. But in fact nothing could be further from the truth.9
The difficulty is apparent in the concise and lucid contribution by
Judge Thomas Ambro and Paul Safier.10 Ambro and Safier correctly
observe that the First Amendment does not apply in the absence of state
action, and they rightly affirm that the First Amendment must thus be
interpreted in light “of the dangers uniquely associated with government
interference in the development and expression of ideas.”11 But they
interpret these dangers in light of what they regard as “the pervasive
First Amendment norm of content neutrality,”12 and they deduce from
this norm that we ought to preclude government from “pick[ing]
winners” within “‘expert’ disputes.”13 They speculate that this
conclusion is justified by the limited institutional competence of courts.
How, they ask, can “ill-informed judges” possibly make
“pronouncements from seemingly ex cathedra seats of judgment”?14
7. See Johnson & Duran, supra note 3, at 501 (“[T]he threat of costly SLAPPs can effectively
deter the exercise of free expression.”).
8. Id. at 501–06.
9. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 1–25 (2012).
10. Thomas L. Ambro & Paul J. Safier, The First Amendment, the Courts, and “Picking
Winners,” 87 WASH. L. REV. 397 (2012).
11. Id. at 400.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 401, 402, 408.
14. Id. at 404.
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Ambro and Safier’s argument is built on the premise that “the
pervasive First Amendment norm of content neutrality” corresponds to
what Holmes calls “the real and the true.”15 But this premise is false. It
turns out that the rule against content discrimination is applied in only
limited circumstances. The rule applies to speech within public discourse
but not to speech outside of public discourse. Government routinely
regulates commercial speech based upon its content; we know that
commercial speech enjoys no First Amendment protection if it is false or
misleading.16 Government also routinely regulates the speech of
professionals like doctors based upon its content. Bad advice risks
sanctions for medical malpractice.17 There are countless such
examples.18
Judge Ambro has himself written an excellent opinion in Natale v.
Camden County Correctional Facility19 in which he accurately observes
that “[i]n the typical malpractice case, the duty of care, or ‘the standard
of practice to which the defendant-practitioner failed to adhere[,] must
be established by expert testimony.’”20 But this observation implies that
courts must determine the competence of medical advice based upon
their evaluation of expert testimony. When expert testimony conflicts,
courts must pick a “winner” in order to ascertain liability.
I mention this prosaic example to illustrate how easily we are misled
by abstract First Amendment doctrine. The “pervasive norm” of content
neutrality does not apply to the typical malpractice case, in which courts
are routinely regarded as capable of “picking winners” within “expert
disputes.” In fact, courts evaluate expert opinion virtually every time
they determine whether to admit expert testimony challenged under Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.21 Because there is no universally
15. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 460.
16. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–64
(1980) (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that
do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”).
17. Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 949–52 (2007).
18. See Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV. 451–
52 (2012) (“Outside what Schauer calls the ‘boundaries’ of conventional First Amendment
coverage, in such areas as securities fraud, the government evaluates (and punishes) statements on
the basis of their truth or falsity.” (citing Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765
(2004))).
19. 318 F.3d 575 (3d Cir. 2003).
20. Id. at 579 (quoting Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 167 A.2d 625, 628 (N.J. 1961)).
21. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–95, 597 (1993).
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applicable First Amendment norm against content discrimination, courts
are not generally regarded as incompetent to adjudicate expert
controversies.22
This suggests that we do not discourage courts from second-guessing
expert opinion in public discourse because we regard courts as
institutionally incapable of doing so. We instead discourage courts from
second-guessing expert opinion in public discourse because we do not
wish them to do so. And no doubt we reach this conclusion because we
do not want government to control the content of public discourse.
The most fundamental question of First Amendment doctrine is why
we disable courts from regulating speech within public discourse,
although we pervasively empower courts to regulate speech outside of
public discourse. The thesis of my book is that this doctrinal structure
expresses our constitutional commitment to achieving the “social end”
of democratic legitimation. A democratic state must be responsive to
public opinion, which is why “[a] democracy without public opinion is a
contradiction in terms.”23 A necessary condition for democratic
legitimacy is therefore that persons be free to participate in the formation
of public opinion.24
The norm against content discrimination is applied within public
discourse because we do not want the state to form the very public
opinion to which it should be democratically responsive. Seen from this
angle, the explanation of the “pervasive” norm of content discrimination
depends precisely upon the limited scope of its application. The norm
applies within public discourse, but not outside it. Attending to the
actual ways in which we regulate speech, rather than to the ways in
which abstract First Amendment doctrine proclaims that we regulate
speech, is thus essential to understanding the social ends that
constitutional doctrine in fact seeks to achieve.
In his fascinating and comprehensive contribution, Paul Horwitz is
determined not to be fooled by the bromides of First Amendment

22. This conclusion is not inconsistent with the thought that there may be specific contexts in
which judicial deference to expert opinion is warranted. In the specific context of disputes involving
academic freedom, for example, I quite agree with Ambro and Safier that it might sometimes be
difficult for courts to take “constitutional sides in academic debates involving knowledge gleaned
from scientific inquiry.” See Ambro & Safier, supra note 10, at 407. Nevertheless, like Ambro and
Safier (as well as like Professor Judith Areen), I also believe that there is no ground for judicial
deference when “professional judgment” is not exercised. Id. at 406–07; POST, supra note 9, at 79.
23. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 287–88 (Anders Wedberg trans.,
1945).
24. POST, supra note 9, at 9–10, 22–23.
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doctrine.25 He refuses to be misled by the abstract and patently refutable
generalizations that courts advance in the name of the First Amendment.
Instead Horwitz rightly inquires into the “social end” that the First
Amendment law should be construed to help bring about. It is apparent
that he holds great affection for the claim that “a search for truth” is “a
central goal of the First Amendment.”26 Yet Horwitz seems puzzled
when his research reveals that First Amendment doctrine is
indeterminate and indecisive on the elemental question of whether false
statements of fact come within the umbrella of First Amendment
coverage.27
One might expect that the fascinating results of his research would
drive Horwitz to conclude either that achieving truth is not presently a
central organizing purpose of First Amendment doctrine or that we
should reorganize First Amendment doctrine so that it can most
effectively ascertain truth. Curiously, however, Horwitz does not seem
attracted to either option. He instead advances a melancholy narrative of
declension.
As Horwitz tells the tale, there has been a serious “decline of truthseeking arguments for freedom of speech.”28 He strongly implies that
because “First Amendment law will inevitably be concerned with
epistemically freighted concepts such as truth, falsity, accuracy, and
reliability,”29 these arguments must be accorded pride of place in First
Amendment doctrine.30 He seems depressed by the fact that in recent
years “free speech theory itself has increasingly retreated” from truthseeking justifications, and has “focused instead on other justifications,
such as democratic self-government or individual autonomy.”31
Whatever else can be said about Horwitz’s complex position, the
declension narrative is unconvincing. Although in past centuries many
have argued that freedom of critical inquiry is necessary for the
advancement of knowledge,32 American judicial decisions applying the
25. See Horwitz, supra note 18.
26. Id. at 472–73.
27. Id. at 467–70.
28. Id. at 489.
29. Id. at 487–88.
30. Although it seems quite true that First Amendment doctrine must inevitably deal with such
epistemological questions, the same could be said of every area of law. Having to deal with
epistemological questions is a far cry from being about such questions. It does not follow from the
prominent presence of such questions that the First Amendment is primarily about truth seeking.
31. Id. at 489.
32. For a very brief overview, see MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON
GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 11–27 (2009).
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First Amendment have almost always been about political speech.33
Indeed, they have typically explained themselves in terms that echo
Chief Justice Hughes’ pioneering 1931 opinion in Stromberg v.
California34: “The maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of
the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional system.”35
If First Amendment doctrine has from the beginning been organized
to “bring about [the] social end” of democratic legitimation rather than
of truth,36 the doctrinal uncertainties nicely exposed by Horwitz should
come as no surprise. “Epistemic” issues of truth or falsity are merely
ancillary to the primary point of First Amendment jurisprudence, which
is to protect the free formation of public opinion. Horwitz can of course
argue that First Amendment doctrine should be reorganized to achieve
the primary goal of advancing knowledge, but he does not seem inclined
to take that path.
Instead his inquiry gravitates toward such mid-level questions as
whether “false statements per se are a ‘special case’ that demand an
exception from the general coverage of the First Amendment.”37 This
kind of question takes the abstract and general nature of First
Amendment doctrine at face value, and it therefore risks reproducing
exactly the pathology of First Amendment doctrine that Horwitz seems
determined to avoid. First Amendment principles can coherently be
formulated only if they are organized to achieve clear social values. If
the First Amendment’s primary purpose is to protect democratic
legitimation, general questions about the abstract constitutional status of
“false statements per se” can have no very cogent answer. Sometimes
falsity will be tolerated to further the mission of democratic legitimation,
sometimes it will not.
With regard to the criminal libel of a public official, for example, the
U.S. Supreme Court once proclaimed:
[E]ven where the utterance is false, the great principles of the
Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area
preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the
33. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
34. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
35. Id. at 369.
36. See POST, supra note 9, at 1–25.
37. Horwitz, supra note 18, at 461.
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knowing or reckless falsehood. Debate on public issues will not
be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be
proved in court that he spoke out of hatred.38
The Court has repeatedly interpreted the First Amendment to protect
mere falsity so that “uninhibited” participation in public discourse can be
constitutionally encouraged. Outside public discourse, by contrast, the
Court regularly interprets the First Amendment to penalize mere falsity,
as is illustrated by constitutional standards applied to commercial speech
or professional medical advice.39
This strongly suggests that First Amendment doctrine is not in fact
organized around epistemic concerns. Of course, ceteris paribus, falsity
matters. But First Amendment doctrine deliberately subordinates
epistemological concerns to the requirements of democratic legitimation.
To ask an abstract question about the status of false statements is to pose
an inquiry that runs against the purpose of existing First Amendment
doctrine. Horwitz seems so entranced by epistemic values that with one
exception he fails to recognize how fundamentally First Amendment
doctrine would have to be reorganized in order to be fully responsive to
his concerns.
The exception involves Horwitz’s articulate defense of an
“institutionalist” First Amendment.40 Horwitz advocates extending First
Amendment protection to “infrastructural institutions that form a
fundamental part of a larger public sphere.”41 Examples would
apparently include universities, the press, libraries, churches, and
voluntary associations, which together Horwitz regards as constituting
38. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964). In what is undoubtedly the high water mark of
the Millian emphasis on the epistemological value of error that Horwitz so nicely discusses, the
Court continued, “even if [a speaker] did speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed
contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.” Id. at 73. As Horwitz
correctly observes, the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), subsequently
repudiated the proposition that the publication of false statements honestly believed to be true can
contribute to “the ascertainment of truth,” thus leaving as the sole justification for the protection of
falsity within public discourse the political importance of uninhibited participation in public
discourse. See Horwitz, supra note 18, at 469–70. The Court explained in Garrison, quoting New
York Times:
For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment. The First and Fourteenth Amendments embody our “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials.”
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74–75 (quoting N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270).
39. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
40. Horwitz, supra note 18, at 480–86.
41. Id. at 481 (emphasis in original).
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“a kind of ‘sovereign sphere.’”42 As far as I can make out, Horwitz
believes that such institutions should be constitutionally shielded from
political regulation because they contribute “in unique ways to the
production of knowledge and deserve[] protection or autonomy.”43
Horwitz’s argument on this point is so casual that it is difficult to
follow. Does he seriously believe that voluntary associations and
churches produce knowledge?44 And although I quite agree that
institutions like universities do produce knowledge, how should their
contribution to knowledge be weighed against other equally important
constitutional values, like democratic self-governance? Does Horwitz
believe that conflicts among constitutional values do not occur? Or does
he believe that in the context of such conflicts the significance of
knowledge is so predominant that it is a waste of time to engage in the
“considerable and somewhat gymnastic effort” to determine how
inconsistent constitutional values may be reconciled?45 I fail to see how
we could possibly determine the precise degree of “autonomy” to which
infrastructural institutions should be “constitutionally entitled” without
answering such questions.46 The hardheaded legal realism that Horwitz
so conspicuously embraces would seem to require that we focus on such
inquiries.
Stephen I. Vladeck, like Horwitz, believes that the press is a unique
and significant infrastructural institution.47 In contrast to Horwitz,
however, Vladeck is exquisitely aware that specifying constitutional
protections for the press will require mediating among conflicting
constitutional values. In his fine and careful contribution, Vladeck nicely
demonstrates how attributing constitutional autonomy to the press will
have both costs and benefits.48
42. Id. at 481 & n.235, 482.
43. Id. at 485. It is not clear to me why Horwitz regards “the production of knowledge” as any
less “abstract” than conceptual categories like democratic legitimation or democratic competence.
Id. at 479, 481. It is true that the production of knowledge is not ultimately a political category and
that Horwitz appears to object to prioritizing political self-determination as a constitutional value.
Id. at 478–80. Perhaps Horwitz believes that the social stability required for deploying knowledge
does not require a secure foundation in legitimate self-governance. See id. at 486. There may be
societies in the world where knowledge creates its own legitimation and stability, but I doubt that
the United States is among them.
44. Alternatively, if churches and private associations do not produce knowledge, what social
goods do they produce, and why should these goods receive exigent constitutional protection?
45. Id. at 479.
46. Id. at 482 (emphasis in original).
47. Stephen I. Vladeck, Democratic Competence, Constitutional Disorder, and the Freedom of
the Press, 87 WASH. L. REV. 529 (2012).
48. Id. at 548 (“But the more we seek to articulate constitutional rules for distinguishing between
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The press is a deeply ambiguous institution. Seen from one
perspective, the press is a platform for amplifying the voice of engaged
citizens. Since the early days of the Republic, the press has functioned as
a mouthpiece for partisan politics; different newspapers have spoken for
different points of view or for different political parties.49 Seen from
another perspective, however, the press is a unique institution quite
distinct from the ordinary citizen. For the past century, elite newspapers
have imagined themselves as independent, disinterested, and
professional organizations whose mission is to educate the public about
newsworthy matters.50 This ideal, born during the progressive era, has
begun to take institutional root. As Vladeck summarizes the point:
[T]here are professional standards and ethical norms of conduct
to which journalists generally aspire. A professional accrediting
organization (the Accrediting Council on Education in
Journalism
and
Mass
Communications)
supervises
undergraduate and graduate programs. Additionally, whether or
not courts have already identified such standards, it is
possible . . . to identify judicially manageable standards of
journalism that would allow courts to differentiate between
those who qualify as practitioners in the field and those who do
not.51
In our own time, the independent and disinterested institution of the
press is torn between the distinct and potentially conflicting values of
“neutrality” and “objectivity.”52
these categories, the more that the recipients of special protection in that constitutional scheme
become dependent upon protecting their special constitutional status. Such a result would also
almost certainly come at the expense of whatever other values contribute to their role in illuminating
public discourse.” (emphasis in original)).
49. This view of the press may underlie the Court’s recent observation in Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010): “We have consistently rejected the proposition that the
institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.” Id. at 905 (citing
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 691 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). If the
press is simply a means of amplifying what ordinary speakers have to say, it should not possess
privileges beyond those of the First Amendment speakers whose voices it broadcasts.
50. See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
NEWSPAPERS 160–94 (1978). Horwitz refers to this relatively recent image of the press when he
observes that “Press practices are rich with disciplinary standards and well-developed selfregulatory norms and practices.” Horwitz, supra note 18, at 484).
51. Vladeck, supra note 47, at 540–41 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
52. A “neutral” press understands its mission as reporting on public controversies, but it avoids
taking part in such controversies. A neutral press will convey to the public that a controversy exists
between creationists and biologists over the topic of evolution, but it will not intervene to evaluate
competing positions in the controversy. A neutral press therefore incentivizes persons to
manufacture “controversies” that threaten public opinion with confusion. This can plainly be seen in
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In my book, I observe that there are good reasons why the
disciplinary norms of professions like medicine or law should sometimes
be accorded independent constitutional status.53 I suggest that the First
Amendment should be interpreted so as to foster this status because it
will advance the constitutional value of “democratic competence.”54
Vladeck sensibly asks whether First Amendment doctrine ought also to
be interpreted to configure the press as serving the value of democratic
competence. After all, Vladeck argues, this might express proper respect
for the necessary role played by the press in educating the public about
matters of public concern; it might also justify special legal immunities,
like reporters’ privileges, that seem necessary for the press to fulfill its
educational mission.55
In evaluating Vladeck’s suggestion, we should note at the outset that
the institutional autonomy of the press can be constitutionally justified
without appealing to the value of democratic competence. Vince Blasi
long ago persuasively argued that the First Amendment should be
interpreted to serve a “checking value,” which imagines the press as a
unique set of institutions that inhabit a structurally antagonistic
relationship to government.56 We wish to protect the press because we
wish to encourage the press to “check” the possibility of government
abuse. As a matter of theory and history, Blasi’s hypothesis has much
support.57 Vladeck’s discussion of national security demonstrates how
protections for the press are most important in circumstances when the
the advantage that the tobacco industry took of the obligations of a neutral press to report only the
existence of a “controversy” over whether smoking was harmful. In contrast to a “neutral” press, an
“objective” press will not only report the existence of public controversies, it will also evaluate the
significance of these controversies by communicating presently existing knowledge. Whereas a
“neutral” press will report to the public that there is a controversy over global warming, an
“objective” press will also frame that controversy by reporting the consensus of scientific opinion.
For an illustration of the difference, see Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, Admit It: The
Republicans Are Worse, WASH. POST, April 29, 2012, at B1.
53. POST, supra note 9, at 45–46.
54. Id. at 27–60. Democratic competence refers to “the cognitive empowerment of persons within
public discourse, which in part depends on their access to disciplinary knowledge. Cognitive
empowerment is necessary both for intelligent self-governance and for the value of democratic
legitimation.” Id. at 34.
55. Vladeck, supra note 47, at 541–42.
56. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521. The checking value plainly underlies decisions like Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 583–85 (1983), which configure the press as distinct from
other speakers and as generically in conflict with the government.
57. See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983).
Under Blasi’s theory, of course, the “press” would be constitutionally defined as those institutions
that we regard as advancing the checking value.
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press and the government occupy adversarial positions.58
The concept of structural conflict is quite foreign to the value of
democratic competence. Modeling the constitutional status of the press
on the kind of disciplinary authority enjoyed by medicine or law would
authorize government interventions designed to uphold press authority,
just as government presently intervenes to uphold the authority of
doctors and lawyers.59 Such interventions would be quite problematic if,
as Blasi convincingly argues, we wish to fashion First Amendment
principles that will institutionalize tension between the press and the
state.
Vladeck’s essay asks us to clarify why we might accord special
constitutional status to the press. Should constitutional rules imagine the
press as amplifying the voice of ordinary citizens, or as providing the
public with a disinterested and professional form of knowledge, or as
“checking” government overreaching and abuse? Holmes’ sound advice
is that we cannot determine the substance of our constitutional doctrine
until we are first clear about the “social ends” we wish to achieve.
It is possible that we are ambivalent about our social ends. We may
yearn both for a professionally competent press and yet admire a press
that is freewheeling and partisan and that, as Vladeck puts it, exemplifies
“truly amateur contributions to public discourse.”60 We may
simultaneously prize press institutions that valiantly oppose the
government. When our constitutional values conflict in this way, it
would seem deeply unwise to fashion our constitutional doctrine to give
exclusive dominion to one or another point of view. The ambiguity of
contemporary doctrine reflects the ambiguity of our own values, and
Vladeck seems to me prudent to leave these questions unresolved.
If constitutional law cannot guarantee that expert knowledge be
disseminated to the public through the press, how does constitutional
law imagine that expert knowledge will be communicated to public
opinion? That is the question Joseph Blocher pursues in a shrewd and
canny contribution.61 Blocher suggests that if our constitutional
principles do not permit government to underwrite an authoritative

58. Vladeck, supra note 47, at 543–47.
59. As Joseph Blocher perceptively observes, using the value of democratic competence to define
the constitutional value of the press would “mean that the state could police journalists in much the
same way as it polices commercial or professional speech—to ensure that they are fulfilling the
functions that entitle them to protection in the first place.” Joseph Blocher, Public Discourse, Expert
Knowledge, and the Press, 87 WASH. L. REV. 409, 442 (2012).
60. Vladeck, supra note 47, at 547.
61. Blocher, supra note 59.
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expert to speak to the public, we may well ask “whether and to what
degree expert knowledge actually does inform democratic
decisionmaking.”62
Blocher’s question is well taken, and it does not seem to me to have a
definitive constitutional answer. We know that the state does underwrite
expertise outside of public discourse; that is the lesson of malpractice
suits and state proscriptions of misleading commercial speech. But we
seem reluctant to allow the state analogously to underwrite expertise
within public discourse. This is because we do not wish the state to
control the content of public opinion. We would feel queasy if the state
were to intervene authoritatively to settle the conflicting
pronouncements of the dueling experts that routinely fill our news
media. Does this imply, as Blocher seems to suggest, that expertise can
exist within public discourse only if the state underwrites it?63
Through its educational responsibilities, through its bully pulpit and
enormous resources, the state can encourage a proper respect for expert
knowledge within the public sphere. But whether such knowledge
receives the weight it deserves within public discourse is not ultimately a
question of constitutional law, at least not so long as democratic
legitimation remains our foundational constitutional commitment. I
myself believe that democratic legitimation must remain lexically prior
to democratic competence because any action of the state, including any
action designed to underwrite expertise, must necessarily presuppose
that the political interventions of the state are legitimate. Such
legitimacy necessarily depends upon democratic legitimation. This
implies that if public opinion recklessly abandons authoritative
knowledge in an uncontrolled quest for ideological wish fulfillment, the
Constitution alone will not save us.64

62. Id. at 437.
63. Blocher writes that “there must be some method of accountability, legal or otherwise, for
claims of expertise in public discourse.” Id. at 434. But of course there is always political
accountability for speech within public discourse. Why is that not enough? Why “must” there also
be legal accountability, when any such accountability will necessarily compromise democratic
legitimation? No doubt democratic competence would be better served if the state could impose
legal accountability for expert pronouncements within public discourse. But the cost of such
accountability would be intolerably high. Blocher’s yearning for constitutional clarity seems also to
underlie his strange assumption that attributing First Amendment value to particular speech acts
implies “complete protection” or is simply a vain act. Id. at 424–25. Because constitutional values
often conflict, constitutional protection is frequently bounded and limited.
64. Blocher writes that “it seems hard to maintain the division between expert knowledge ‘in’
public discourse and expert knowledge ‘before’ public discourse. If the point of knowledge is to
inform public discourse, at some point it must enter into it.” Id. at 435. He is right to raise this
worry. Although Blocher correctly grasps the constitutional “point” of expert knowledge, he seems
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For constitutional purposes, public opinion forms within the
uncoerced domain of public discourse. In my book I define public
discourse in terms of the communicative processes required for the free
formation of public opinion prerequisite for democratic legitimation:
The contours of First Amendment coverage, the constitutional
distinction between speech and action, is therefore to be
determined in the first instance by a normative inquiry into the
forms of conduct we deem necessary for the free formation of
public opinion. . . . Following the usage of the Court, I shall use
the term “public discourse” to refer to the forms of
communication constitutionally deemed necessary for formation
of public opinion.65
Public discourse is the set of speech acts whose insulation from state
control is necessary to justify our ongoing belief that we inhabit a
democracy in which government is responsive to the people. What we
think of as “ordinary” First Amendment rules, like the “pervasive” norm
of content neutrality to which Ambro and Safier appeal, typically apply
to state regulations of public discourse. The basic thought is that the
state ought to answer to public opinion rather than control the content of
public opinion.
Blocher fears that this definition of public discourse is “circular.”66 I
confess that I do not understand his objection. “Public discourse” is a
label that we apply to those speech acts that we deem, for constitutional
and normative reasons, necessary for the free formation of public
opinion. The boundaries of public discourse are thus set by substantive
normative judgments. Whether to categorize any particular speech act as
inside or outside of public discourse no doubt requires difficult and
complex judgments and trade-offs.67 Sometimes such judgments are
made retail, and sometimes wholesale. I have no doubt that the
boundaries of public discourse will prove perennially controversial. But
to imagine a world in which the Constitution can guarantee that expert knowledge actually fulfills
its “point.” That aspiration seems to me quite beyond the realm of constitutional law. The
Constitution encourages conditions under which expert knowledge might be able to fulfill its
“point,” but the Constitution cannot compel public opinion, at least not so long as we remain a
democracy.
65. POST, supra note 9, at 15.
66. Blocher, supra note 59, at 414. I should note that in my view the boundaries of public
discourse are contextually defined, which means that they are determined by form and content.
Blocher seems to imagine that I think otherwise, id. at 418–21, but I make this explicit in Robert C.
Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990).
67. For a full discussion, see POST, supra note 9.
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there is nothing at all circular about the question of whether particular
speech acts should be accorded the constitutional protections we afford
to public discourse.
In the end we will define the boundaries of public discourse in ways
that express our commitments to the value of democratic legitimation.
These commitments invariably conflict with other complementary and
inconsistent constitutional goals and values. Such constitutional conflicts
and uncertainties are inevitable. There is no avoiding them. There is only
the endless effort to think things, not words.

